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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S·TATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent:, 
-vs.-
S. VV. DOWS.E and PEARL DOWSE, Case No. ·7949 
his ,vife, JAY E. TREADWAY and 
MARION MA VE TREADWAY, his 
wife, and A. C. WHITTAKER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, A. C. WHITTAKER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from the judgment and the order 
denying defendants' motions for· new trial in this case 
wherein plaintiff sued to quiet his title to the property, 
to vacate and set aside a Sheriff's sale and D·eed and for 
damages. The title of all the defendants' property at 
issue is predicated upon an execution issued January 4, 
1950 on a cost bill in another proceeding between Messrs. 
Pender and Dowse. The Sheriff's sale was completed 
March 14, 1950, the certificate was issued and recorded 
March 23, 1950, no redemption was made and then a 
Sheriff's Deed was ex~cuted, delivered and recorded Sep-
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tember 16, 1950 in favor of S. W. Dowse. 
This· appealing defendant, A. C. Whittaker, there-
after was requested to loan $5000.00 to S. W. Do,vse and 
his wife and was offered a first mortgage lien upon lots 
2, 3 and 4 of Block 8, North Colun1bia Subdivision a~ 
security for the loan. Mr. Dowse procured a policy of title 
· insurance showing himself as the owner and exhibited 
such to A. C. Whittaker (R. 173). He testified that: "I 
wouldn't be interested unless I knew the title was clear," 
(R. 124) and then in reliance upon a policy of title in·-
surance issued after the n1ortgage fron1 S. W. Dowse and 
Pearl Dowse had been recorded (R. 170), he loaned the 
$5000.00 November 1, 1950. This loan has not been repaid 
and A. C. Whittaker claims a first 1nortgage lien on these 
three lots. 
We shall sun1marize the facts in the case particularly 
as the same relate to .the issue of the validity of the first 
mortgage of the defendant, A. C. Whittaker upon Lots 
2, 3 and 4 of Block 8, North Columbia Subdivision in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. These lots are situated at the corner 
of 13th South and West Temple Streets and there is 
in evidence an abstract of title, introduced by the plain-
tiff, Exhibit "F" (R. 74). 
The record shows that on October 30, 1950, S. W. 
Dowse and Pearl Dowse executed and delivered to thi~ 
defendant, A. C. Whittaker, their Promissory Note, Ex-
hibit 7 (R. 159) and a real estate 111ortgage, I1~xhihit "I/• 
(R. 159). The said n1ortgage shows that th~ san1e was 
duly recorded and was executed to secure the loan n1ade 
in the sum of $5000.00 as evidenced bv the said note and 
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1nortgag·e. Prior to the execution of said note and mort-
gage and the making of the loan,· Mr. Dowse exhibited 
to Mr. vVhittaker a policy of title insurance, Exhibit 9 
(R. 171), dated October 9, 1950, showing the title to said 
property vested in the name of S. W. Dowse, subject to 
certain minor tax and other liens, and Mr. Whittaker 
testified as to said matter as follows : 
"Q. What is that please~ 
.A... That is policy of title insurance in the name of 
S. W. Dowse for $10,000, dated October 9th, 
1950. 
Q. Now, I will ask you whether or not this policy 
was ever showed to you prior to your seeing 
the policy just previously mentioned~ 
A. Yes, Mr. Dowse told me he had ti tie insurance 
on this and I saw this. 
Q. You saw this~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to the transaction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you or did you not rely on this~ , 
A. I absolutely relied on this title insurance, yes 
s1r. 
Q. You absolutely identify this as the title in-
surance policy you saw 1 
A. Yes sir." (R. 171-172) 
Then at the tin1e of closing the transaction, Mr. 
Dowse procurred a policy of title insurance, Exhibit 8 
(R. 110) and Mr. Whittaker testified in response to a 
question as to whether he had any evidence of the condi-
tion of the title to the property presented to him. 
3 
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"A. I was furnished With title insurance. 
Q. I will sho\v you \vhat has been 1uarked Pro-
posed Exhibit "8" and ask you to exruuine 
that and state \vhat that is. 
A/ This is policy of title insurance rove ring the 
loan." (R. 160) 
He testified on cross-examination as to the method 
of closing the loan. 
"Q. Now then did you talk to the Insurance con1-
pany before they issued ·the policy~ 
A. I did not, no sir. 
Q. I take it Mr. Dowse went to them and got the 
policy and delivered it to you~ 
A. He did. 
Q. He never discussed it \vith you~ 
A. Not the title. 
Q. Did Mr. Dowse ever tell you he bought this 
property at execution sale~ 
A. Not prior to this -not prior to the rnortgage. 
Q. When did he tell you~ 
A. After this case was instituted, I was a party 
defendant. 
Q. But you never yourself talked to the title 
people~ 
~1:R. CHRISTENSON: I object to that 
again. It is repetitious and furthern1ore it 
doesn't direct us to any time, particular RUh-
ject or refPrence to this ease. 
Q. (by MR. DAINES:) I a1n referring to DP-
fendants Exhibit "8" and I will ask you if yon 
at any· ti1ne ever talked to the title people be-
fore they issued thi~ poliey? 
-1-
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\ 
.... \.. 1 ;e.forp the~· i~~ued this policy, no sir. 
Q. \\:'""as the poliey issued before or after execu-
tion of the n1ortgage ~ 
..:\.. The policy \\·as delivered with the mortgage 
and note at the tin1e I gave him the· check for 
$5,000.00." (R. 167 -168) 
Additional testimony by Mr. Whittaker relative- to 
the transaction and issuance of the title insurance IS 
found at page 120 of the Record: 
~'Q. nir. \\~hittaker, prior to lending money on 
this property, did you, or did you not have a 
discussion \vith Mr. Dowse relative to a policy 
of title insurance~ 
A. Why we rnay have talked about title insur~ 
ance. 
Q. Did you ask for either abstract or title insur-
ance)? 
A. Title insurance. 
Q. And this was prior to the date you have testi-
fied that the policy was delivered to you, and 
that you paid the $5,000 over to him~ 
A. Yes sir, yes indeed. 
Q. And did you examine this policy of title in-
surance- \veil, did you read it~ 
A. Casually I read it." (R. 170) 
The Promissory Note for $5,000 was payable 2 years 
froin date with interest payable semi-annually. As the in-
terest was not paid during the first two semi-annual peri-
ods, this defendant declared the entire amount to be due 
and owing, 1nade demand for payment and then when 
nothing was paid, on March 7, 1952 he started action to 
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forclose the mortgage by case K o. 9470() entitled A. C. 
Whittaker v. S. W. Dowse and Pearl Do\\~se (R. 160). 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff therein, 
A. C. Whittaker, for the amount of principal, interest, 
attorneys' fee and costs prayed for and a Decree of Fore-
closure of the mortgage and Order of Sale were duly en-
tered by the Court. 
In the present litigatio~, an appraiser, representing 
the plaintiff, testified that in his opinion the value of the 
three lots affected by the mortgage and in which 1\Ir. 
Whittaker asserts his interest was, as of the date of 
March 14, 1950, worth $6,000.00. (R. 79). This appraisal 
was based upon the assumption that: 
"Q. Mr. LeCheminant, you were asked the value 
of this property under execution sale, have 
you had opportunity to buy property under 
execution sale~ 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Are you aware of the fact, an execution sale 
on real estate is subject to the right of re-
demption by the owner of the property? 
A. I know that. 
Q. The purchaser n1ay or may not have title, de-
pending on whether the owner redeen1s in that 
period of time J 
A. l\fy opinion of value is all based on good Inar-
ketable title. 
Q. Based further on the fact the vendor would 
furnish title 1 
A. It n1ust be a good marketable title. 
Q. And based further on th(-l assun1ption the 
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vendor \Yould give l~vidence of title either by 
abstract or title insurance'? 
....-\. rrhat is eorrect.'' (R. 84) 
.. A .. s to the basic title in litigation, 've shall direct our 
attention solely to these three lots on the corner of 13th 
South and West Te1nple. The abstract of title covering 
the srune (Exhibit "G") is a part of the record and re-
veals the follo,ving background of title evidence : starting 
with 1916 there was a tax sale to Salt Lake County re-
sulting in an Auditor's Tax Deed on Lot 2 on May 15, 
1922. Then on all three lots there was a 1931 tax sale fol-
lowed ·by an _._~uditor's Tax Deed dated April 10, 1936. 
The tax title there to 'vas then sold to S. W. Dowse ·for 
·$750.00 by Deed of Salt Lake County dated August 27, 
1945. This tax title was in turn sold .by S. W. Dowse to 
l~ennold Pender by Quit Clain1 Deed dated August 10, 
1945, recorded Septeinber 4, 1945. No revenue stamps 
are affixed and only nominal consideration is stated. 
']hereafter Mr. Pender apparently procurred Quit Claim 
Deeds from various heirs of former owners for nominal 
consideration only, and later completed a quiet title ac-
. 
tion against other claimants. 
As of the dates of the Levy, ·sheriff's Sale and 
Sheriff's Deed in Case No. 8689·5 (Jan. 4, 1950, ·Mar. 14, 
1950 and Sept. 16, 1950) there was ·no recorded decree in 
the quiet title action, so the interests of Olive Trickett 
et al. were still outstanding of record and there were 
unpaid taxes o'ving to Salt Lake County for 1949 in the 
amount of $161.36 and acerued 1950 taxes due on the 
prem1ses. In addition there was a $13.20 judgment lien 
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and the further judgment lien in favor of Morandi 
(Exhibit 11) for $3068.44. 
Let us examine the facts of the execution sale as re-
vealed by an abstract of title on these three lots mort-
gaged to Mr. Whittaker. The judgment appears to bP 
regular in all respects (see file in Case No. 86895 showing 
service of copies of the Findings, Decree and Cost Bill 
upon the attorneys for Mr. Pender and the admission of 
regularity thereof as stated in the pretrial order). The 
·execution levy was duly recorded F'ebruary 9, 1950 in 
Book 7 40, page 527 thereby giving constructive notice to 
.Mr .. Pender and all the world. The Sheriff's Certificate 
of Sale, dated March 1?, 1950 was recorded J\farch :2:1. 
1950 and is regular and complete in each and every detail 
and gave constructive notiee to Mr. Pender and all th~ 
world of the sale_ and right of redemption as provided 
by law. The Sheriff's Deed, dated September 16, 1950 
was recorded on the sarne date and likewise 'vas regular 
and complete in all details and particulars and gave notice 
to Mr. Pender and all of the world of the fact that title 
had passed without redemption and that S. W. Dowse 
wa.s the owner of the title formerly claimed by R.ennold 
Pender. 
Mr. T. N. Bleak, who was the rhief civil deputy in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Sheriff at the time 
of the Sheriff's Sale in question, testified concerning the 
procedure followed at the Sheriff's Sale and particularly 
as to the n1ethod of giving notice of the time of the said 
sale on cross examination : 
"B1.,. J\1R. PUGSI~E)T (On behalf of the defPndan~ 
Whittaker) 
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Q. Jlr. Bleak \\~hat notic.es were posted prior to 
the time of the sale Y 
.A.. The notice of levy 'vas first posted, I think, on 
the - the copy of notice, levy and the copy of 
execution were first recorded with the Re-
corder of the County, and then the law re-
quires that we either post or serve the tenant 
in possession of the property a copy of notice 
of levy, which was done, and afterwards we 
were on February, or close to February the 
17th the first notice of sale wa.s published in 
the Salt Lake Times and for four weeks, and 
there 'vas· no den1and on my part made of Mr. 
Pender, or no copy served on him personally 
after it was recorded in the Recorder's of-
fice. 
Q. Are there any notices posted about the City 
and County Building in Salt Lake- relative 
to these sales~ 
A. Yes there are usually three. 
11:R. DAINES: I move to strike the word 
"'usually" . 
.. :\. There are three in my handling of foreclosure 
sales, all the sales under execution, three 
notices are posted at the County Building. 
Q. (by ~fr. Pugsley) Are there also notices 
posted in three public places in Salt Lake 
County? 
A. The notice of sale is always posted on th~ 
property, one copy, and two copies in the pre-
ci:p.ct in addition to the one posted at the 
COUll ty building. 
Q. Is that the customary posting done in this 
sale1 
1\.. That was the way-
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·MR. DAIXES: Just a ntinute-
1\IR. PLTGSLEY: Let 1ne finish. 
Q. (by i:\Ir. Pugsley) Is that the custornary po~t­
ing you did on all this type of execution ~ales! 
MR. DAINES: I object, it is incoinpe-
ten t, irrelevant and immaterial. 
THE COL1RT: It is overruled. 
A. That was always the custom in the sheriff's 
office to post notices just in that manner in 
all real estate sales. 
Q. Thatwas done in this sale~ 
A. Yes." (R. 142-143) 
"BY MR. PUGSLEY: (On behalf oft~ defendant 
Whittaker) 
Q. May I ask one further question~ 
· Do you· know how 1uany notices were 
posted on this property there in question~ 
A. I don't recall now, Mr. Pugsley, but it is my 
recollection I posted notices on each one of the 
pieces of property that were listed on the 
praecipe as long as they were contiguous to 
each other, as long as the lots 'vere contiguou~ 
to each other, I only post one copy of the 
notice on each piece of property. 
Q. Those not contiguous you posted ~eparate 
notices~ 
A. I posted separate notice on those not eontigu-
ous to each other. 
MR. PlTGS.LEY: rrhat is all. 
Q. You posted on thrPe or four pie<·Ps of prop-
erty~ (by 1\lr. Daines) 
A. Four or five a~ l renH~lnher~ ~\1 r. DainP!"~ l 
1.0 
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posted on the corners or in the i1nn1ediate 
vicinity of all the pieces of property." (R. 144) 
The Court did not make any 'findings contrary to 
the evidence stated by the said deputy sheriff and the 
Court did not find that any lack of notice existed or fail-
ure of any recording of the time of sale or the certificate 
of sale or Sheriff's Deed. The only findings made by 
the Court relating to the procedure of the sale were as 
follo,vs: 
"13. That the property, at the time it was 
offered and sold at Sheriff's Sale was offered and 
sold enn1asse and that said property was not at 
any time offered at sale in separate parcels. That 
it was apparent that 1nore than enougn property 
required to be sold to satisfy said judgment, was 
being sold at the sale. That defendant S .. W. 
Dowse and his attorney, LaMar Duncan, were the 
only persons present to bid at said sale. That no 
return was attached to the execution showing that 
the sheriff had made any attempt to satisfy the 
judgment by the sale .of unexempt personal prop-
erty belonging to plaintiff." 
"15. That the levy so made by the sheriff was 
excessive and the price for "vhich the property 
'vas bid in was grossly inadequate and the said 
sale was accompanied by irregularities. That the 
public record under 'vhich the sale 'vas had re-
flected these facts." 
The Sheriff issued in his regular and customary form 
a Certificate of Sale, Mar. 23, 1950, and after the expir~­
tion of the six months redemption period, a Sheriff's 
Deed, dated Sept. 16, 1950. These were both duly re-
corded and contain nothing on the face thereof to reveal , 
11 
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to any purchaser, title exaininer or other person that the 
said sale was conducted in any but the regular statutory 
manner. There is no evidence of record to show or imply 
that A. C. Whittaker had any actual notice of the pro-
cedure followed by the Sheriff in the advertising, offering 
or sale of said property nor of the co1nparatively no1ninal 
amount paid for the property by Mr. Dowse. 
By this abreviated statement of facts, this defendant, 
A. C. Whit'take,r, does not waive the other pertinent facts 
or law that may be presented by the other defendants 
jointly or severally in defense of their respectiYe posi-
tions. This defendant asserts that there is no factual or 
legal basis for vacating the Sheriff's sale and Deed to 
S. W. Dowse. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THAT A. C. WHITTAKER IS A BONA FIDE MORT-
GAGEE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY TITLE 
DEFECTS. 
POINT TWO 
THAT THE RECORD TITLE REVEALED NO PATENT 
OR OTHER TITLE DEFECTS OR ANY INTERESTS OF 
PLAINTIFF; AND HE MAY NOT lVIAKE A COLLATERAL 
ATTACK ON THIS MORTGAGE OR THE SHERIFF'S DEED. 
POINT THREE 
THAT ALL INTERESTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THESE 
THREE LOTS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED 
BY THE SHERIFF'S SALE AND DEED. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT THE SMALL AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION AT 
THE SHERIFF-'S SALE DID NOT PLACE A. C. WHITTAKER 
ON ANY DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
12 
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POINT FIVE 
THAT PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE PROTECTION 
OF TITLES PASSING THROUGH SHERIFF'S SALES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS ONE AND TWO 
THAT A. C. WHITTAKER IS A BONA FIDE MORT-
GAGEE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY TITLE 
DEFECTS. 
THAT THE RECORD TITLE REVEALED NO PATENT 
OR OTHER TITLE DEFECTS-OR ANY INTERESTS OF 
PLAINTIFF; AND HE MAY NOT MAKE A COLLATERAL 
ATTACK ON THIS MORTGAGE OR THE SHERIFF'S DEED. 
The burden of proof in this type of case, as in many 
others, is definitely on the plaintiff and we submit that 
there has been no evidence of any character to show that 
the defendant, A. C. Whitaker had any notice whatsoever 
of the interest no'v asserted by Pender in and to these 
three lots. 
21 Am. Jur. 305: 
"Ordinarily, the party seeking to vacate· an 
execution has the burden of proof, and the court 
rnust presume the execution to have been regular, 
until proof ha.s been adduced to the contrary; 
but where the circumstances are such a.s to make 
I 
the execution prima facie invaltd, he who seeks 
to sustain it must introduce evidence to prove its 
validity." 
The evidence shows a good marketable 'title of record 
and a complete reliance on the part of Mr. Whittaker on 
the marketability thereof as shown by the policy of title 
insurance issued in such form as to reflect his m·o!tgage 
as a first lien upon the property. He testified that Mr. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Do,vse had never advised hin1 of any intere~t as!"erted by 
Mr. Pender and there had been no occasion to discuss any 
such matter between them at the ti1ne of 1naking the loan. 
It was not until after this action had been instituted and 
1fr. Whittaker had been served with Sun1n1ons that he 
made inquiry of 1\{r. Dowse concerning the clain1s of ~Ir. 
Pender. The evidence is \vithout dispute that the three 
lots in question were vacant and there was nothing about 
them that would indicate an ownership interest that might 
be asserted by .Mr. Pender. Without any admission as 
to any pretended signs on certain war surplus materials 
behind the service station on other lots in the la\v suit, it 
must be kept clear that nothing appears in the record indi-
cating. a sign or personal property or other i te1n that 
would excite the inquiry of Mr. Whittaker or anyone else 
dealing with or in!suring the title to the three lots at the 
corner of 13th S.outh and West Temple. 
The record title of the property showed no residual 
interest or clairn that might be asserted by 1\{r. Pender 
after the expiration of the reden1ption period and the 
issuance of the Sheriff's Deed to Mr. S. W. Dowse. The 
execution creditor and purchaser, prior to the issuance 
of the ·policy of title insurance and the passing of the 
money from Mr. Whittaker to him, had paid off the out-
standing tax encumbrances and recorded the necessary 
documents to eliminate the outstanding adverse interests 
that had been subjects of quiet title actions at an earlier 
date. One does not know what would be expected of a 
purchaser or 1nortgagee if he n1ust investigate, by per-
sonal inctuiry, each and every step of a recordPd ti tie and 
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probe into the detail~ of all judicial sales that appear of 
record in a regular and complete form. 
The title, having appeared to the mortgagee and the 
title insurance con1pany as being full and complete and 
that the mortgage was a first lien upon the prop·erty, we 
find that the present action is a collateral attack upon the 
mortgage by one who is not a party thereto. The Sheriff 
was not made a party defendant. The appeal period on 
the judgment for costs had expired, the appeal period on 
the cost bill had expired, the reden1ption period had /ex-
pired and the Sheriff's Deed had issued, and for all ap-
pearances the plaintiff, Pender, had been fully divested 
of any sen1blance of ownership in and to the three lots 
mortgaged to A. C. Whittaker. Plaintiff does not contend 
that the sale by the Sheriff was "void" but only voidable. 
One of the most serious flaws in the plaintiff's pro-
ceeding is that he has made a collateral attack upon the 
deed issued by the Sheriff, without making the Sheriff 
a party defendant, and also that the plaintiff has en-
deavored to impeach this written document as well as the 
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale by parol evidence. The action 
of the Trial Court in permitting such an impeachment of 
the deed and Certificate of Sale opens a wide field for liti-
gation on ahnost every title that has passed through a 
Sheriff's sale at any point in its history. An element of 
uncertainty will be injected in the conveyancing practice's 
throughout the State of Utah of such magnitude that no 
one vvill be willing to risk the approval of an abstract 
of title nor the issuance of a policy of title insurance if at 
any f'tage a Sheriff's conveyance or other judicial pro-
15 
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ceeding such as a probate sale, receiver's sale, foreclosure 
of mortgage, or execution on judgment is involved. 
It is the position of this appealing defendant that it is 
in viola·tion of the Constitution of the State of Utah to 
allow the judgment of the Court to stand in this case~ 
as such deprives this defendant of his property rights 
without just compensation and without due process of 
law. 
POINTS THREE AND FOlTR 
THAT ALL INTERESTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THESE 
THREE LOTS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED 
BY THE SHERIFF'S SALE AND DEED. 
THAT THE SMALL Al\10UNT OF CONSIDERATION AT 
THE SHERIFF'S SALE DID NOT PLACE A. C. WHITTAKER 
ON ANY DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
It is well settled that a mortgagee such as A. C. Whit-
taker, who was in good faith loaned $5,000.00 upon prop-
erty that is appraised at $6000.00 in value, is regarded 
as a bona fide purchaser thereof. 
59 C.J.S. 302: Rights of Mortgagee 
"A mortgagee of reality is regarded a~ a pur-
chaser thereof; and, if his mortgage i~ support eo 
by an actual present consideration and is gi\len 
and taken in good faith and 'vithout fraud, heiR to 
be treated as a bona fide purchaser for value, and 
as such protected against ad verse· clain1s of \vhieh 
he has no notice, actual or eonstruetive, i JH·luding 
not only prior deeds or other conveyances of the 
premises, but also all other liens on the1n or elailll~ 
of interest in the1n, sneh as prior 1nortgages or 
Yendor's liens." · 
It is not eontended by the plruntiff that this Rheriff'~ 
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8ale i~ vo,id, but n1erely that there are some Inatters or 
confidential relationship or 1ninor irregularities that 
should permit the advoidanee of the transaction at this 
late date. Therfore, any interest that the plaintiff had 
in the three lots 'vas con1pletely extinguished by the 
Sheriff's execution, sale and deed the-reon. If there is a 
re-vesting of the title back in the plaintiff as a result of 
the present proceedings, such title must be subject to the 
bona fide first mortgage lien asserted by Mr. A. C. Whit-
taker. 
Our Supreme Court has considered son1e of these 
issues, and we should like to refer to one of the more 
recent decisions. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah · 
297, 85 Pac. (2d) 770. Therein your Court considered 
the rights of the parties during the redemption period and 
held that a purchaser at execution sale acquires all the 
right, title, interest and claim of the debtor, including 
the right of possesion, legal title, and rights to crops 
harvested during the rede1nption period, after expiration 
of the redemption period and not before. The court cited 
Sec. 104-37-29, U.C.A., 1943, which reads: 
"lT pon a sale of real property, the purchaser 
is substituted for and acquires all the right, title, 
interest and claim of the judg1nent debtor there-
to·" 
' 
The court pointed out that the legal ti tie does not 
pas's under a mortgage foreclosure sale until the sale 
is consummated by a conveyance since there would be no 
neees~ity for a conveyance if the legal title had already 
passed, but after the conveyance then the title vests abso-
lutely in the granteP frorn the sheriff. 
17 
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The case of Dickert z_:. W ei.-.,·e was early decided by 
our Court ( 2 Ut. 350) as to validity of _a Sheriff's ~ale. 
Under a decree of foreclosure the officer offered two lots 
and had no bidders and then offered then1 together and 
.sold them to plaintiff on a bid under the judgment. It 
was held that such a sale was not invalid. 
The status of the record in thi'S case no"'" before 
the Court is that the execution sale was eonducted, the 
redemption period was past and the Sheriff's Deed issued. 
The reeord is complete 'vith the evidence that notice·~ 
were given as required by the statute of Utah for the 
sale of 'the said property; that plaintiff frequently passed 
the property; that the· plaintiff's agent, ~f r. Lartch, "'"ho 
operated a service station on the adjacent property, ob-
served the lots in issue and could and should have seen 
the notices and advised the plaintiff thereof; in addition 
the plaintiff had eonstructive notice of the levy and sale 
by the recording of the execution levy, the posting of 
notices upon the property, the posting in three public 
places in ·salt Lake County, the posting of notirPs at the 
Court House and the publication thereof in the Salt Lake 
Times, a newspaper of general circulation within the 
eounty, to which the plaintiff's· attorne~,. subscribed dur-
ing the period of the publication of the notice. The only 
attaek that apparently has any reason behind it i~ thr 
claim that the property 'vas not sold in separatP }>:lr<·Pls 
by the Sheriff. The testimony of the Deputy Sheriff, 
T. N. Bleak, was that he 1na~e the recording of the no-
tires, the posting and publication thereof and <'Onducted 
the sale in the custo1nary 1nanner, but that because thertl 
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'vere no other bidders pretsent, he did not do the useless 
thing of requiring a separate bid on each individual lot 
involved in the property, but offered the same by reading 
the legal descriptions of the property out loud to the bid-
ders present. The only bidders present were Mr. Dowse 
and his attorney, Mr. LaMar Duncan, who both t~stified 
that the property was offered in three parcels and that 
three separate bids were 1nade by Mr. Duncan on behalf 
of ~Ir. Dowse for the same. 
We urge that the claim, that the Sheriff's Sale is-void-
able because of the failure to offer each lot separately, 
is not well taken in light of the decisions of our Supreme 
Court. In the case of .Adams v. Pratt, 87 Utah 80,48 Pac. 
-(2d) 444, the court held on a mortgage foreclosure sale, 
which is a situation very similar to an execution sale, was 
not void because of the sale of the property en mas'se. 
"Nor do the authorities support plaintiff's 
contention that the sale of the property in· the 
mortgage foreclosure suit en masse is void. On the 
contrary, thi~s court has held tha1 it is proper in the 
mortgage foreclosure suit to sell the property en 
masse if bids for the separate lots or parcels can-
not be had. Dickert v. ·Weise, 2 Utah 350. The 
cases are generally to the effect that a sale of 
property en masse, even where it should be sold 
separately, is not such an irregularity as renders 
the sale void. 13urton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 76 
P. 563: rrhomas V. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 P. 
283, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 616; Fox v. Curry, 96 1\font. 
212, 20 P. (2d) 663; Batini v. lvancich, 105 Cal. 
.:\pp. 391, 287 P. 523; 23 C. J. 532-535." 
It is to be noted that the Sheriff's Certificate of 
Sale and the Sheriff's Deed do not reflect any of the prP 
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tended deficiencies in procedure and hence a Inortgag~ 
for value, such as this defendant Whittaker, \vould haYe 
absolutely no notice thereof. The n1atter of inadequacy 
of price has been considered by our Court at an earlier 
time and we find in the decision in the case of Young r. 
Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, Affirmed by U.S. Sup. Ct.161, U.S . 
. 334, the following law; that though courts someti1ne set 
aside a sale where great inadequacy of consider~ation ex-
ists, coupled with irregularities attending the sale, yet 
they will not set aJside a sale after the redemption period 
has expired where the irregularities are merely for1nal 
and technical and did not have a direct tP-ndency to pre· 
vent the realizing of a fair price for the property sold. 
Certainly the burden of proof that the plaintiff had in this 
case has not been discharged in showing that other bid-
ders were prevented from offering higher or better price~ 
for the property by the pret~nded irregularity of the 
Sheriff's failure to offer each individual lot ·separately at 
the time of the sale. Certainly ii other or better bids 
coUld have been procured, it was up to the plaintiff tL 
produce evidence thereon. No other bidders were present 
to n1ake any different offers. 
A similar n1atter of consideration of inadequacy of 
price is found in the case of National Realty Sales Co. v. 
Ewing, 55 Utah 438, 186 Pac. 1103. Therein the court hPld 
that an execution 'sale is not invalidated hy inadequacy 
of price as against the judgment debtors grantee \\'herr 
the proceedings \Vere fair and regular and there is 
nothing of notice to the grantee that would suggest fraud 
or cone(Jalment. Certainly th(J poliey of the la'v is thnt 
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an exeeution sale that appears regular in all respects 
should be protected by the courts otherwise the exchange 
aD.d transfers of property 'Yould be interminably confused 
and prejudiced. The n1ere fact that a small amount of 
money was paid at the Sheriff's Sale did not place· this 
defendant, Whittaker, on any duty of inquiry. The record 
is full of title deficiencies that n1ay be pointed out to show 
that a bona fide purchaser at a Sheriff's Sale would not 
pay any su1n in excess of that actually paid as the· pur-
chaser would be faced with numerous difficulties in re-
demption of delinquent taxes, clearing up title problems 
and removing outstanding judgment liens. As we pointed 
out in the Statement of Facts, the only 'vitness as to value 
wws a real estate man who testified that his evidence pre-
sumed a good marketable title, free from all encum-
brances, together with a Warranty Deed and abstract of 
title. No one testified as to the reasonable value of this · 
property at execution sale, having in mind the status of 
the same. 
POINT FIVE 
THAT PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE PROTECTION 
OF TITLES PASSING THROUGH SHERIFF'S SALES. 
As indicated above, the free exchange of property 
involves a matter of public policy that dictates respect 
for titles passing through execution sales as well as 
through the regular course of conveyance. A decision by 
our Supren1e Court at one time inferred that a small 
iunount' of consideration alone would place a purchaser 
on a duty of inquiry, but the Legislature felt that such 
decision- Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Ut. 298, 212 Pac . 
. >.26', was unlawful, and Section 78-1-6 was amended hy 
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Chapter 106 of the 1945 session of the Legislature to pro-
· vide that: 
"Neither the fact that an instrument recorded 
as h~rein provided recite:-; only no1ninal considera-
tion ... shall operate to charge any third person 
with notice of the interest of any person or per-
sons not nru11ed in such instrument or of the 
grantor or grantors;" 
The Utah State Bar Association has adopted certain 
title standards, one of which, No. 10, reads as follows: 
"The mere fact that a deed recites a nominal 
consideration, or that the grantee in the instru-
ment is designated as trustee, or that the convey-
ance otherwise purports to be in trust should have 
no significance, and title can be conveyed by the 
named grantee as in ordinary cases. A nominal 
consideration or indication of trust is no longer 
notice of equitable interest unle,ss the instru1nent 
itself, or some other independent instrument, is 
recorded setting forth the names of the benefici-
aries, specifying the beneficial or equitable inter-
est held and describing the property eharged with 
the trust. See Chapter 106, 1945 Session Law:-:. 
(The rule is otherwise until May 8, 1946, as to 
instruments recorded prior to l\fay 8, 1945.) '' 
All of the~se reflect the general policy of the law that 
the court will sustain a bona fide purchase for value or 
mortgagee for. value even though the chain of title re-
flects a small amount of consideration. l\fore recently 
in the case of Commercial Bank of [Jtah v. ltfadsen, :!:16 
Pac. (2d) 343 your Court held that where a mortgag~ 
foreclosure sale \Vas regularly held and fairly conducted, 
it would not be set asidP in the ahRenre of fraud n1Prrl~' 
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·because a higher bid \Vas offered. Likewise the Court 
held therein that the fact that the land sold at mortgage 
foreclosure \Vas described as Lots 1 and 2 did not make 
separate tracts of an otherwise unified parcel within the 
statute relating to execution sales of real property. 
Plaintiff elected not to sue the Sheriff whose deed 
establishes the title. We submit, therefore, that the first 
mortgage lien of A. C. Whittaker should be sustained 
in all respects and that regardless of the outcome· of the 
litigation between Mr. Pender and ~1r. Dowse, the mort-
gage lien of A. C. Whittaker niust be p·rotected ~d judg-
ment quieting title against the same should be reversed. 
We urge the Court to consider the effect of the pres-
ent action of the District Court upon this title when 
viewed as a precedent by la-\vyers and title insurance com-
panies throughout the State of Utah. What lawyer will 
feel safe in executing an opinion approving a title that 
has pa.!ssed through any type of judicial sale, knowing 
that a collateral attack may be brought to impeach the 
recorded documents upon \Vhich the title is passed. The 
far reaching effect of this decision will be felt in not only 
foreclosure and execution sales, but also in the probate 
of estates of decedents, guardian's sales, receiverships, 
etc. The innumerable land titles that have passed through 
judicial sales will all be placed in jeopardy and a chaotic 
title condition will result if the action of the District 
Court is sustained. 
\Ve urge that this Court reverse the judgment of the 
District Court and direct said Court to enter findings and 
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judgment that the mortgage held by A. C. Whittaker is a 
first lien upon the premises described therein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY D. Pl:GSLEY 
of 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTOK 
721 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GORDON B. CHRISTENSON 
Judge Building 
S·alt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for A. C. Whittaker, 
D·efendant and Appellant. 
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